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OCI No. 5777/55

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
2 September 1955

TO: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Brazilian presidential elections of 3 October 1955

1. Offices to be filled: Presidency and vice presidency of Brazil. Gubernatorial elections are also scheduled for this fall in Alagoas, Maranhao, Mato Grosso, Minas Gerais, Para, Paraiba, Parana, Rio Grande do Norte, and Santa Catarina; the Superior Electoral Tribunal has recommended that these and other elections be held concurrently with the national election

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2. Parties or factions participating:

- A. Social Democratic Party (PSD). Largest party with the strongest grass-roots organization. Supported the late president Vargas. A currently dissident faction composed of state PSD organizations exists in Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Sul.
- B. National Democratic Union (UDN). Regarded as moderate conservative party. Was largest opposition party to Vargas.
- C. Brazilian Labor Party (PTB). Leftist. Appeals to urban labor. Was Vargas' personal vehicle.
- D. Social Progressive Party (PSP). Left-of-center. Well-organized machine headed by former Sao Paulo governor Adhemar de Barros. Main strength in Sao Paulo.
- E. Republican Party (PR). Conservative, nationalist. Basic strength is in Minas Gerais and Bahia.
- F. Party of Popular Representation (PRP). Ultra-rightist survival of old native fascist movement. Minor party.

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- G. Liberator Party (PL). Minor liberal party. Advocates parliamentary type of government.
- H. Christian Democrat Party (PDC). Advocates Catholic social and economic doctrines. Minor party.
- I. Brazilian Social Party (PSB). Minor leftist party.
- J. Brazilian Communist Party (PCB). Largest Communist Party in western hemisphere. Present estimated membership, 120,000; estimated voting strength, 500,000. Outlawed since 1947.

3. Outstanding personalities:

- A. Juscelino Kubitschek, Social Democrat, presidential candidate of PSD, PTB, and PR. Supported by Communists, although he himself has no record of pro-Communist sympathies. He is a former governor of Minas Gerais.
- B. Joao Goulart, head of PTB and vice-presidential candidate of PTB and PSD. As labor minister under Vargas from June 1953 to February 1954, he co-operated with Communists. Particular target of armed forces opposition.
- C. General Juarez Tavora, presidential candidate of PDC, PSB, PL, UDN, and dissident PSD. Former chief of President Café Filho's military household. Although referred to as moderate conservative he has antagonized industrial support by advocacy of socialist and advanced papal social and economic tenets.
- D. Milton Campos, head of UDN and its vice presidential candidate.
- E. Adhemar de Barros, colorful, corrupt boss of PSP and that party's presidential candidate.
- F. Plinio Salgado, PRP head and presidential candidate.
- G. General Henrique Teixeira Lott, war minister. Adamently opposed on principle to any military interference in politics,

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
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4. Present party strength: Although President Café Filho is a member of Adhemar de Barros' PSP, he professes to be neutral in the present campaign. He is known, however, to be strongly opposed to Kubitschek and Goulart. Party strengths in Congress, as a result of October 1954 elections, are as follows:

	<u>PSD</u>	<u>UDN</u>	<u>PTB</u>	<u>PSP</u>	<u>PR</u>	<u>PL</u>	<u>Others</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Senate	23	14	15	4	3	2	2	63
Chamber of Deputies	116	74	60	32	20	10	14	326*


*This figure probably includes a number of Communist and Communist-sympathizers; at least four Communists reportedly were elected last October on other party tickets.

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6. Principal factors influencing the outcome: The PSD's well-financed and well-organized political machinery combined with the PTB's appeal to urban labor appear to have won the largest popular support to Kubitschek and Goulart. Since the Kubitschek-Goulart following includes a high proportion of semi-literates, the voting reform measure of 30 August 1955 may slightly reduce their effective support. The new law provided that, in those places where timely distribution is possible, a single-ballot system shall be substituted for the former system of individual voting slips.

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7. Background: Kubitschek's campaign got off to an early start with his selection by the PSD national committee in November 1954 and his nomination by the PSD national convention in February 1955. Opposition efforts, endorsed by President Café Filho and top military leaders, to agree on a candidate were fruitless until late June, and the vehemence of military opposition to Kubitschek increased his popular appeal. The PSP's nomination of Adhemar de Barros on 11 June

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cut this lead, however, since Barros appeals to the same sort of voters as Kubitschek.

In July the Communists abandoned their attempts to run an independent "people's" candidate and in August announced their support of Kubitschek, despite their earlier attacks on him.

8. Informed opinion on outcome: At this time, the ticket headed by Kubitschek appears to be in the lead. If Barros withdraws from the race, Kubitschek is almost certain to win. Salgado will be a poor fourth.

Goulart may well get fewer votes than Kubitschek since he is opposed by Kubitschek's conservative supporters. Nevertheless, he is somewhat more likely to win the vice-presidency than the UDN's Milton Campos, the only other vice-presidential candidate nominated thus far.

9. Significance for US security interests: All three major candidates are reportedly friendly toward the United States, but none has stressed any pro-US sympathy for campaign purposes. Since all three recognize Brazil's continuing need for US technical and financial assistance, the incoming administration, no matter who heads it, will probably be outwardly pro-US, but will probably find it expedient on occasion to drive a hard bargain in return for its friendship.

If Goulart is elected and is permitted to take office by the military, the Communist Party's prestige will be initially enhanced. The military can probably be expected to exert considerable pressure on both Kubitschek and Goulart to prevent any extensive pro-Communist activity by the latter.


Acting Assistant Director
Current Intelligence

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